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Dissents and Concurrences: Seven
Debates in Charter Jurisprudence
W. David Rankin & Mahmud Jamal*

The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms1 15 times in 2012.2 Of these 15 judgments, seven
— approximately half — featured a dissent or concurrence. This is a
somewhat higher rate of disagreement than in the Court’s decisions generally: of the 75 judgments released in 2012, 25 judgments, or one-third,
were not unanimous.
This is hardly surprising. The Charter is an open-textured instrument
— a living tree, drafted for all time — that admits of flexibility and
growth.3 These are the seeds of dissent. Compounding this, Charter cases
often spring from the fault lines in Canadian society. The 2012 batch of
cases is no exception. A woman wears a niqab owing to her sincere
religious convictions. Must she take it off to testify as the complainant in
a sexual assault trial? Do employees have a reasonable expectation of

*
Both of the Ontario Bar and of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. The authors thank Sonja
Pavic, articling student-at-law, for her valuable research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
This paper reviews only those cases where the Charter was directly in issue. Cases such
as Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.), in which the Charter
was used as an interpretative aide, are excluded. Included in the list of cases, however, are all three
of the unanimous jury selection trilogy cases (R. v. Emms, [2012] S.C.J. No. 74, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 810
(S.C.C.), R. v. Yumnu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Davey, [2012]
S.C.J. No. 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 (S.C.C.)). While the Charter is not cited in all three cases, the
concept of trial fairness directly put ss. 7 and 11(d) at issue.
3
M.D. Kirby, “Judicial Dissent — Common Law and Civil Law Traditions” (2007) 123
Law Q. Rev. 379, at 28 (PDF doc) [hereinafter “Kirby”] (referring to the U.S. Constitution);
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 82
(S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C.:
To evoke Lord Sankey’s celebrated phrase in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada,
[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), at p. 136, the Canadian Charter must be viewed as ‘a living tree
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’: see Reference re Provincial
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p. 180, per McLachlin J.
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privacy in their work computers? Do the presumptions of accuracy and
identity in the breathalyzer provisions in the Criminal Code4 limit the
Charter right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty? Reasonable
persons disagree about these sorts of things, often with conviction. The
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada can be expected to differ with
no less passion.
The following paper takes a closer look at the 2012 dissents. Taking
the lead of Scalia J. of the United States Supreme Court, we define dissents to include what are technically concurrences. “[T]here is little
difference” between them, Justice Scalia explains. “Legal opinions are
important … for the reasons they give, not the results they announce.”5
Our objective is to study those reasons — to identify the rifts, the language and the trends in the 2012 Charter dissents. We begin by
discussing the role of dissents in Charter cases generally. We then review
the seven Charter debates that the Court could not resolve unanimously
in 2012.

I. THE ROLE OF DISSENTS IN CHARTER CASES
Chief Justice McLachlin has noted that “the Charter is engrafted
onto the living tree that is the Canadian constitution”.6 This principle has
been recognized since the earliest days of Charter jurisprudence.7 If the
Charter is “a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its
natural limits”,8 it should come as no surprise that reasonable people will
disagree on how it ought to grow — how far its branches ought to reach;
how it ought to shoot and blossom. This is the nature of the Charter, with
its broad, open language. Dissents and differing approaches are to be
expected.
These expectations of divergence are borne out by experience. Since
its adoption, the Charter has given rise to above average levels of disagreement within the highest court. In his 2004 study, Peter McCormick
explains how the growing number of Charter cases on the docket resulted
4

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”].
A. Scalia, “The Dissenting Opinion” (1994) J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 33 [hereinafter “Scalia”].
6
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991]
2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J. (as she then was).
7
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155-56 (S.C.C.),
Dickson J. (as he then was).
8
Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, 136
(J.C.P.C.), Viscount Sankey.
5
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in a steady rise in non-unanimous decisions, starting with the Dickson
Court, and then into the Lamer and McLachlin Courts.9 As the Charter
matured, however, the distinctiveness of a Charter dissent (as compared
to other types of dissents) was seen to diminish. On the Dickson Court,
Charter cases were 2.5 times as likely to be split, whereas this figure
shrank to 1.5 times during the Lamer Court — and 1.4 times in the first
two years of the McLachlin Court.10 In 2012, our year of focus, Charter
cases were about 1.4 times more likely than non-Charter cases to give
rise to a dissent.
This enhanced rate of divergence must be understood in light of the
distinctive role of Charter dissents. Former Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,
building on the work of Brennan J., formerly of the U.S. Supreme Court,
articulated three principal goals of a dissent: to prophesize, to stir
dialogue, and to safeguard the integrity of the law and judicial
institutions.11 Each of these functions takes on a special dimension, and
increased importance, in the realm of Charter jurisprudence.
Take the prophetic role of a dissent. There are many celebrated
examples of dissents and concurring reasons becoming the law in later
cases.12 As L’Heureux-Dubé J. has phrased it, “dissenting opinions are
often intended more for the legal minds of tomorrow than for those of
today”.13 As Canadian law incrementally develops — and as the living
tree of the Constitution grows — dissents of the past may reflect the
law of the future. The great dissenters, the ones who foresee these

9

Peter McCormick, “Blocks, Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the
Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 25, 28, 30 [hereinafter
“McCormick”].
10
Id., at 26, 28, 30.
11
Hon. C. L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” (2000)
38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 495 [hereinafter “L’Heureux-Dubé”]; see also Hon. W.J. Brennan Jr., “In
Defense of Dissents” (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 427 [hereinafter “Brennan”].
12
See, e.g., Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1973] S.C.J. No. 150, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Murdoch”], Laskin J. (as he then was) (dissenting), adopted in Rathwell v. Rathwell,
[1978] S.C.J. No. 14, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436 (S.C.C.), Dickson J. (as he then was) (plurality), later
adopted in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] S.C.J. No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.), Dickson J. (as he
then was) (majority).
13
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 508-509. See also Hon. R. Bader Ginsburg, “The
Role of Dissenting Opinions” (2010) 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1, at 4 [hereinafter “Ginsburg”]
(“Describing the external impact of dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Hughes famously said:
‘A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal … to the intelligence of a future day, when a later
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have
been betrayed.”).
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developments and who live them in the present, have been artfully styled
the “Prophets with Honor” within the legal system.14
Prophetic dissents are not limited to Charter or constitutional cases.
One need only consider the dissent of Laskin J., as he then was, in
Murdoch v. Murdoch,15 or the prophetic dissents penned by L’HeureuxDubé J. as she gradually moved parts of Canadian law in the direction of
gender equality.16 But prophecy has a special role where Charter values
are at stake. The living tree doctrine recognizes that there will be a future
audience of constitutional opinions that will not necessarily share the
constraints of our more dated institutions.17 Charter dissents will
continue to facilitate the “gradual liberalization of constitutional
interpretation”.18
Consider United States v. Burns, where the Court unanimously held
that it would breach section 7 of the Charter to extradite an accused
person to a retentionist state without an assurance that the death-penalty
would not be sought (except in “exceptional” cases).19 This decision
effectively foreclosed the death penalty in Canada, but it was not the first
time that the Court had considered the issue. A decade earlier, in Kindler
v. Canada (Minister of Justice) and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.),
the Court reached the opposite result in two deeply divided 4-3 splits
(each in four opinions).20 Though the Court in Burns did not expressly
14
A. Barth, Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters in the Supreme
Court (New York: Knopf, 1974); Brennan, supra, note 11, at 432 (“Justice Harlan transcended,
without slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he sought to announce fundamental constitutional truths
as well. He spoke not only to his peers, but to his society, and, more importantly, across time to later
generations. He was, in this sense, a secular prophet, and we continue […] to benefit from his
wisdom and courage.”).
15
See supra, note 12. See also L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 505.
16
See, e.g., R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“O’Connor”]. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was a significant proponent of dissents. On the occasion of
her retirement from the Supreme Court, she remarked that “[d]issents are a positive force which
enhances collegiality, provides the legal community with alternatives, [and] influences majority
rulings …”: “Remarks of the Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé at the Ceremony to mark her
Retirement”, June 10, 2002.
17
It is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada can and will revisit its past Charter decisions
when there are “compelling reasons to do so”: R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609,
at para. 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Henry”], Binnie J.
18
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 508.
19
United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.).
20
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779
(S.C.C.); Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.).
See Henry, supra, note 17, at para. 44, Binnie J.:
In Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680, it was said that “[t]his
Court has made it clear that constitutional decisions are not immutable, even in the
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endorse any of the dissents in Kindler or Ng, it was no doubt easier to
effectively overturn these precedents given how they splintered.
Though the doctrine of the living tree is not as firmly planted in the
soils of our neighbours to the south, Brennan J. put to words — and to
practice — a similar view. “Because we Justices of the United States
Supreme Court are the last word on the meaning of the Constitution,” he
wrote, “our views must be subject to revision over time, or the
Constitution falls captive to the anachronistic views of long-gone
generations”.21 Dissents in a court of last resort signal to lower courts,
the bar, and society where (at least in the opinion of the dissenting judge)
constitutional law is or ought to be moving.22
The first role of Charter dissents is related to the second — the facilitation of dialogue. Dissents, in general, stir debate in many circles:
professional, societal, academic, legislative, and international.23 They
sharpen majority decisions and, by setting out both sides of the debate,
they keep the court “in the forefront of the intellectual development of
the law”.24 In some cases, they even seek to interface directly with the
profession and courts below, for example, by showing how to distinguish
the majority’s reasons.25
Charter dissents share all of these features, perhaps taking on additional significance. Almost by definition, Charter cases are of particular
interest in a democratic society. They engage societal values that are
shaped and developed through dialogue between the courts, through their
reasons, and society, through the bar. Dissents are a fundamental part of
this forward-looking conversation. They are reported in our media, debated in our law schools, and quoted in our legislative institutions.26

absence of constitutional amendment” (p. 704), and in the Charter context the Court in
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, effectively overturned the
result (if not the reasoning) in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779,
and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858.
21
Brennan, supra, note 11, at 437.
22
Scalia, supra, note 5, at 5 (A 5-4 dissent “at least in constitutional cases (in which, under
the practice of our Court, the doctrine of stare decisis — i.e., adhering to precedent — is less
rigorously observed) emboldens counsel in later cases to try again, and to urge an overruling —
which sometimes, although rarely, occurs.”).
23
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 509-12.
24
Scalia, supra, note 5, at 7; Ginsburg, supra, note 13, at 3. See also L’Heureux-Dubé,
supra, note 11, at 515.
25
Brennan, supra, note 11, at 430.
26
See, e.g., House of Commons Debates (Hansard), Vol. 145, No. 29, 3rd Sess., 40th, Parl.,
April 20, 2010, at 1763, quoting Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J.
No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 630 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”], Cory J. (dissenting). See also
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As Charter jurisprudence is informed by societal values,27 and as dissents
inspire dialogue that may shape them, they have a sort of “feedback effect” within society.28
We come, then, to Charter dissents as a safeguard of integrity and
judicial institutions. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. has explained, dissents
“enhance the judiciary’s legitimacy by preserving and strengthening
judicial independence, by fostering collegiality among judges and by
enhancing the coherence of courts’ decisions”.29 In the Canadian system,
it is each justice’s prerogative to express his or her own opinion. This is
an essential element of judicial independence,30 and it is an experience
the discussion of L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 510-11 (discussing the influence of minority
reasons on legislative developments following O’Connor, supra, note 16).
27
See Rodriguez, id., at 607, Sopinka J.:
While the principles of fundamental justice are concerned with more than process, reference must be made to principles which are “fundamental” in the sense that they would
have general acceptance among reasonable people. From the review that I have conducted above, I am unable to discern anything approaching unanimity with respect to the
issue before us.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
at paras. 49-50 (S.C.C.), per curiam (“Without resorting to opinion polls, which may vary with the
mood of the moment, is the conduct fundamentally unacceptable to our notions of fair practice and
justice?”; “It can be confidently stated that Canadians do not accept torture as fair or compatible with
justice”).
28
This concept of dialogue is related to that put forward in Peter W. Hogg & Allison
A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of
Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75:
Where a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance, then
it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and the competent legislative body as a dialogue. In that case, the judicial decision causes a public debate in which
Charter values play a more prominent role than they would if there had been no judicial
decision. The legislative body is in a position to devise a response that is properly respectful of the Charter values that have been identified by the Court, but which
accomplishes the social or economic objectives that the judicial decision has impeded.
See also Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. The concept of dialogue discussed here is broader, however, in that it does
not necessarily entail the involvement of a legislative body or a legislative response.
29
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 512-13.
30
This is in contrast to other judicial systems where dissents are not accepted, such as in the
French Cour de Cassation or the European Court of Justice: see Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, “The common
law and Europe: differences of style or substance and do they matter?”, The Holdsworth Address
(2007). Seriatim decisions are no longer in vogue in Canada, but we continue to place a premium on
judges’ individual independence. This approach stems from the tradition of the House of Lords.
Though our system once had at its peak the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (which
delivered unanimous decisions throughout its history as Canada’s court of last resort), its historical
division from the House of Lords explained its need for unanimity. Unlike with appeals to the House
of Lords (originally a parliamentary body), appeals to the Privy Council (an executive body) were
resolved in the form of advice to the monarch. At least until 1966, it was considered unseemly to
embarrass the monarch with conflicting advice: Kirby, supra, note 3, at 14.
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lived out to a particular degree in Charter jurisprudence. The “fierce
independence” of our justices is especially pronounced when it comes to
the Constitution.31
Moreover, Charter cases often fall along the fault lines of Canadian
society, sometimes even containing a moral element. In these cases, dissents may be necessary to the justices so as to preserve their personal
integrities.32 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, herself no stranger to vigorous
dissent, put it plainly: “[I]magine the internal conflicts and the frustration
experienced by judges faced with a total inability to express their profound disagreement.”33 Justice Brennan, who by one count dissented in
2,100 death penalty cases,34 had a similar view.35 “[I]t would be a great
mistake,” he wrote, “to confuse [the] unquestioned duty to obey and respect the law with an imagined obligation to subsume entirely one’s own
views of constitutional imperatives to the views of the majority”.36
The connection between dissents and justices’ personal integrity is
most clearly expressed with “perpetual dissents” — that is, the practice
of continuing to dissent after the majority has decided the point.37
Though not as much a part of the Canadian experience as it is in the
United States, we do have a less barefaced version of the perpetual
dissent. Canadian judges often continue to subscribe to approaches that
did not gain majority favour, and may choose not to expand the holding
of a decision in which they dissented. Some of this can be found in the
dissents released in 2012.

II. CHARTER DISSENTS IN 2012
1. L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes38
The first Charter decision of the year, and the first Charter “dissent”,
was not a dissent at all — but a concurrence. Justice Deschamps wrote
for a majority consisting of herself, the Chief Justice, and Binnie, Abella,

31

L’Heureux-Dubé, supra, note 11, at 501.
Id., at 513.
Id.
34
A.O. Larsen, “Perpetual Dissents” (2008) College of William & Mary Law School
Faculty Publications, Paper 46, at 451 [hereinafter “Larsen”].
35
Brennan, supra, note 11, at 437.
36
Id.
37
Larsen, supra, note 34, at 447.
38
[2012] S.C.J. No. 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “L. (S.)”].
32
33
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Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel (Fish J. concurring)
agreed in the outcome, but for different reasons.
The appellants in L. (S.) argued that a school board’s refusal to
exempt children from a mandatory comparative religion program (the
Ethics and Religious Culture Program) infringed their rights under
section 2(a) of the Charter (and section 3 of the Quebec Charter of
human rights and freedoms).39 The court at first instance found that the
parents’ rights had not been infringed (or at least that the parents had
failed to prove otherwise). The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the
appellants’ appeal as of right and their motion for leave to appeal.40
For the majority, Deschamps J. stressed the necessity for the state to
remain neutral when it comes to religion.41 The test, in her view, is “not
whether the person sincerely believes that a religious practice or belief has
been infringed, but whether a religious practice or belief exists that has
been infringed”.42 There is a subjective element to this test, but it is limited
to determining whether the person has a “sincere belief that has a nexus
with religion”.43 The appellants in L. (S.) sincerely believed that they had a
religious obligation to pass on the teachings of Catholicism to their
children, but failed to prove (objectively) that the impugned program
interfered with that obligation. In Deschamps J.’s view, “exposing children
to ‘a comprehensive presentation of various religions without forcing the
children to join them’ [cannot constitute] in itself an indoctrination of
students that would infringe the appellants’ freedom of religion”.44
Justice LeBel agreed in the result, but elected to pen a minority
opinion. In his view, the specific record in L. (S.) did not permit the
conclusion that either the program infringed the appellants’ rights or that
its implementation could not, in the future, infringe the freedom of
religion guarantee.45 There was simply inadequate evidence of what the
implementation of the program would actually mean in Quebec
classrooms. His reasons are clear that he did not intend to finally uphold
the constitutional validity of the challenged program.46

39

R.S.Q. c. C-12.
[2010] J.Q. no 1355, 2010 QCCA 348 (Que. C.A.); [2010] J.Q. no 1356, 2010 QCCA
349 (Que. C.A.); [2010] J.Q. no 1357, 2010 QCCA 346 (Que. C.A.).
41
L. (S.), supra, note 38, at para. 19.
42
Id., at para. 24.
43
Id.
44
Id., at para. 37.
45
Id., at para. 58.
46
Id., at para. 44.
40
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The “compact”47 minority reasons of LeBel J. are perhaps best
understood for their dialogic function. The majority does not expressly
state that the comparative religion program at issue could not, in the
future, be challenged. By explicitly leaving open the constitutional
validity of the program, LeBel J. may have intended to signal this to the
profession (and to the lower courts in Quebec). Bring evidence of the
program’s implementation, he effectively says, and try again. His opinion
may also have been intended to signal to Quebec school authorities that
they must ensure that they implement the program in a Charter-compliant
way. Put otherwise, their success on appeal should not be taken as an
absolute endorsement of the Ethics and Religious Culture Program.
2. R. v. Cole48
The first true Charter dissent in 2012 was that of Abella J. in R. v.
Cole. Writing for herself (an “outlier”, to use McCormick’s terminology),
Abella J. dissented on the application of section 24(2) to the facts of the
specific case — expressing her view that the Court of Appeal was correct
to exclude the unconstitutionally obtained computer evidence. Justice
Fish (writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and LeBel, Rothstein,
Cromwell and Moldaver JJ.) wrote to allow the appeal and admit the
evidence.
The significance of Cole is not in its application of section 24(2), but
in its treatment of section 8. The essential issue was whether the accused
person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the informational content of a laptop issued to him by his employer (a school board).
Technicians found contraband images on the hard drive, and authorities
turned the computer material over to the police, who then searched it
without a warrant. The accused argued that the police had thereby
breached his rights under section 8 of the Charter.49
For the majority, Fish J. agreed that the police had breached section 8.
Even though the accused did not own the laptop, he had a reasonable
(albeit diminished) expectation of privacy in the personal information he
kept on it. Section 8 was thus engaged, and the Crown was not able to
point to any law authorizing the warrantless search by the police. They
were not permitted to piggyback on the authority of the school officials
47
48
49

That is, a single minority opinion signed by two judges: see McCormick, supra, note 9, at 15.
[2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”].
Id., at paras. 5-8.
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to search the laptop, nor did the employer’s purported third party consent
have any legal bearing.50
Despite the infringement of the accused’s section 8 rights, however,
Fish J. decided that the unconstitutionally obtained evidence should not
be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. Applying the framework
in R. v. Grant,51 he found that the admission of the evidence would not
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.52 The courts below had
erred in concluding that the conduct of the officer was “egregious” and
serious enough to favour exclusion,53 and they failed to properly take
into account the diminished nature of the privacy interest or the “discoverability” of the evidence.54
It was on this issue that Abella J. registered her sole dissent. In her
view, the evidence supported the trial judge’s conclusions regarding the
conduct of the officer, and she relied heavily on extracts from the record
to support this position.55 She was also of the view that the search was
highly intrusive (in its extent) regardless of whether there was a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy in the laptop in question.56
It is unlikely that Abella J.’s dissent will have a prophetic or dialogic
function. Time will only tell, of course, but her disagreement had more to
do with her reading of the record than any profoundly different view of
the law. This is not to say that her dissent is not important. As noted, one
of the purposes for dissents in the Canadian system is to enhance transparency and to preserve the personal integrity of the justices. Justice
Abella’s dissent does both. She was unable to agree with the majority on
their understanding of the evidence, and she registered her views on the
public record.
Transparency and personal integrity are institutionally valuable,
provided that the dissent does not attempt to deprive the majority reasons
of their legitimacy. In the case of Abella J.’s dissent in Cole, however,
this is not a concern. There has recently been some attention paid to the
speech acts of dissenting judges.57 Justice Abella employs not just one,

50

Id., at paras. 8-10.
[2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.).
Cole, supra, note 48, at para. 97.
53
Id., at paras. 84-85.
54
Id., at paras. 92-93.
55
Id., at paras. 115-119.
56
Id., at para. 126.
57
“From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the ‘Respectful’ Dissent” (Note) (2011)
124 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 [hereinafter “From Consensus”].
51
52
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but two, of the speech acts associated with dissents that are not intended
to undermine the majority: First, she prefaces her specific points of
dissent with the language of “respect”.58 This practice may seem to be a
matter of course for the justices of the Supreme Court, but it is
nevertheless a significant act. Phrases like “with respect” and “in my
respectful view” soften the language of the dissenting opinion and
contrast with the sort of sharply worded “assertive dissents” occasionally
seen in the U.S.59
Second, Abella J. uses outcome-oriented language (“I would dismiss
the appeal”).60 Much like the practice of Ginsburg J. of the U.S. Supreme
Court,61 Abella J.’s dissent employs non-confrontational, outcomedirected language that does not risk “jeopardizing collegiality or public
respect for and confidence in the judiciary”.62
3. R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux63
We come then to St-Onge Lamoureux, where the Court was asked to
assess certain provisions of the Criminal Code drinking and driving
scheme for Charter compliance. Justice Deschamps again wrote for the
majority (herself, the Chief Justice and LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ.), holding that while the provisions violated section 11(d) of the Charter, they
were justified under section 1 after certain words were severed. Justice
Cromwell (writing also for Rothstein J.) would have found the provisions
Charter compliant.
The provisions at issue, sections 258(1)(c), 258(1)(d.01), and
258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code,64 together established several
presumptions regarding breathalyzer devices. First, the analysis was
58

Cole, supra, note 48, at paras. 107, 115.
“From Consensus”, supra, note 57, at 1322-25. “Assertive dissents” use bare,
confrontational language such as “I dissent” or “I must dissent”.
60
Cole, supra, note 48, at para. 136.
61
“From Consensus”, supra, note 57, at 1324.
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Hon. R. Bader Ginsburg, “Speaking in a Judicial Voice” (1992) 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185,
at 1196 [hereinafter “Ginsburg, ‘Speaking in a Judicial Voice’”]:
The most effective dissent, I am convinced, ‘stand[s] on its own legal footing’[footnote
omitted] it spells out differences without jeopardizing collegiality or public respect for
and confidence in the judiciary. I try to write my few separate opinions each year as I
once did briefs for appellees — as affirmative statements of my reasons, drafted before
receiving the court’s opinion, and later adjusted, as needed, to meet the majority’s
presentation.
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[2012] S.C.J. No. 57, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 187 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “St-Onge Lamoureux”].
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presumed to be accurate and to reflect the accused’s blood-alcohol level at
the time he or she was driving, unless there was evidence tending to show
that: (1) the device was malfunctioning or was operated improperly; (2)
that the malfunction resulted in a blood-alcohol reading in excess of the
legal limit; and (3) that the accused’s blood alcohol level would not have
exceeded the legal limit when behind the wheel (section 258(1)(c)).
The evidence tending to show malfunction or improper operation was
restricted, however, in that it could not include evidence of the amount
of alcohol consumed; the absorption rate in the accused’s body; or a
calculation based on that evidence (section 258(1)(d.01)). Finally, if the
test registered blood-alcohol levels over the legal limit, this was
presumed to be proof that the blood-alcohol levels of the accused were
over 80 at the time he or she was actually driving, unless evidence was
presented tending to show that the accused’s consumption of alcohol
was consistent with both a concentration of alcohol below the legal
limit at the time of driving and a concentration over the limit at the
time of testing (section 258(1)(d.1)). The respondent in St-Onge
Lamoureux argued that these provisions infringed sections 7, 11(c) and
11(d) of the Charter.
The majority and the minority agreed that section 258(1)(c) and (d.01)
did not infringe section 7 of the Charter, and that section 258(1)(d.1)
did not abridge the protection against self-incrimination in section 11(c).65
They could not agree, however, whether the challenged provisions were
consistent with the section 11(d) right to be presumed innocent.
The majority concluded that section 258(1)(c) and (d.01) infringed
this right because, unless the accused rebuts the statutory presumptions,
the trier of fact would be bound to convict notwithstanding that he or she
might have a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the breathalyzer test.
Moreover, section 258(1)(d.1) infringed the right to be presumed innocent
because, unless the presumption was rebutted, the trier of fact would have
to convict even though he or she had a reasonable doubt that the accused’s
blood alcohol was over 80 at the time she was actually driving (say,
because the accused drank shortly before being pulled over, so that the
alcohol did not absorb into the blood until after being stopped).66
Having found that the impugned provisions impinged section 11(d),
Deschamps J. proceeded to section 1. In her view, section 258(1)(d.01)
65
St-Onge Lamoureux, supra, note 63, at para. 123. Justice Cromwell agreed regarding s. 7
for differing reasons: at paras. 126-139.
66
Id., at paras. 27, 85.
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and (d.1) were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
under section 1 of the Charter. So, too, was the first requirement in section
258(1)(c) to rebut the presumption of accuracy (that is, the requirement to
present evidence of a malfunction or improper operation). However, with
the first requirement in place, the others went too far to be justified, and
they were accordingly severed from section 258(1)(c).67
Justice Cromwell’s application of section 11(d) was quite different
from the majority’s. Though he “essential[ly]” agreed with Deschamps J.
regarding what the section 11(d) right entailed, he took the view that none
of the impugned provisions infringed it.68 To him, the section 11(d)
analysis required the Court to answer two questions: (1) if the breathalyzer
analysis was conducted as required in the Criminal Code and resulted in
a blood alcohol reading over 80, would it be reasonable for the trier of
fact to doubt that the accused was over 80 at the time of the test, in the
absence of evidence raising a doubt regarding whether the improper
operation or malfunctioning of the device produced a result over 80? And
(2) if the accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of the test was over
80, would a reasonable trier of fact have any doubt that the blood alcohol
level was in fact over 80 at the time the accused was driving, absent
evidence to the contrary? In his view, in light of the evidence of
reliability and accuracy of breathalyzer tests when conducted according
to the statutory requirements, the answer to both of these questions was
“no”. The challenged provisions did not create a risk of conviction in the
face of reasonable doubt, and, as such, did not limit the presumption of
innocence in section 11(d).69
Justice Cromwell’s dissent may prove to have some “prophetic” element — not in its application to the particular Criminal Code provisions
in issue, but for its articulation of the test under section 11(d). In contrast
to Deschamps J.’s reasons, Cromwell J. gave the analysis more structure
(and lower courts more guidance) on this area of the law. It would not be
surprising to see his articulation of the steps of the section 11(d) analysis
adopted in future cases.70 Justice Cromwell’s statement of the law was
67

Id., at paras. 59, 63, 67.
Id., at para. 145.
69
Id., at paras. 166-167, 171-174.
70
See particularly, id., at para. 151, where he set out the need to: (1) determine the true
nature and scope of the impugned provision; (2) determine the risk of conviction in the presence of
reasonable doubt; and (3) apply the Vaillancourt “inexorably leads” test (R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.)) only if the statute purports to substitute an element for a
constitutionally required element of the offence.
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not inconsistent with the majority’s approach, and has the benefit of being more transparent and easier to apply. Moreover, by occasionally
interpreting the majority reasons, Cromwell J. expressly seeks to provide
guidance to future litigants.71
4. R. v. Dineley72
St-Onge Lamoureux was heard together with Dineley, another drunk
driving case, which also resulted in a Deschamps-Cromwell split. The
only judge to switch camps was the Chief Justice, who, along with
Rothstein J., joined Cromwell J.’s dissent. Justices LeBel, Fish and
Abella again joined Deschamps J.’s majority reasons.
Dineley involved some of the same provisions as in St-Onge
Lamoureux, but questioned the different issue of whether they operated
retrospectively.73 Justice Deschamps’ slim majority held that they did not
on the basis that new legislation that affects substantive rights is
presumed not to have retrospective application unless Parliament clearly
intended otherwise. Applied to Dineley, the new provisions affected the
availability of the “Carter defence” (using a toxicology report to
challenge the accuracy of a breathalyzer).74 As this defence was no
longer sufficient to rebut the statutory presumptions, the amendments
affected substantive rights. Moreover, the amendments affected
constitutional rights, which are necessarily substantive. In Deschamps J.’s
view, therefore, the general rule against retrospective operation ought to
be applied.75

71
Brennan, supra, note 11, at 430. See, for example, St-Onge Lamoureux, supra, note 63,
at para.136, where Cromwell J. states that he “do[es] not understand” Deschamps J.’s reasons “to be
establishing any new principle in relation to the Crown’s obligation to make disclosure to the defence.”
72
[2012] S.C.J. No. 58, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dineley”].
73
Id., only concerned ss. 258(1)(c) and 258(1)(d.01), not s. 258(1)(d.1).
74
See R. v. Carter, [1985] O.J. No. 1390, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Ont. C.A.). In that case,
Finlayson J.A. held that “any evidence as to how much alcohol the person tested had in fact
consumed is relevant evidence and if accepted can raise a doubt as to the accuracy of the
breathalyzer reading”, or, in that case, the blood-sample reading. The trial judge accepted that the
accused had only three beers during the relevant time, and the Crown’s expert conceded that this
quantity of alcohol would have resulted in no reading at all. The “Carter defence”, as it came to be
known, involved presenting sworn testimony as to the amount of alcohol consumed by the accused,
together with evidence from a toxicologist that this amount of alcohol would not have resulted in a
blood-alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml. Prior to the amendments to the Code, this could
constitute “evidence to the contrary” and raise a reasonable doubt. See St-Onge Lamoureux, supra,
note 63, at para. 7.
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Dineley, supra, note 72, at paras. 10, 17-18, 21.
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Justice Cromwell took a different view. He framed the question as
whether the provisions were procedural in nature. It is a presumption of
legislative intent, he explained, that the procedural provisions of a statute
should apply from the moment of enactment — and the amendments at
issue were purely procedural. They were evidentiary and did not change
the elements of the offence. Moreover, he “respectfully” disagreed with
Deschamps J. that the amendments eliminated a defence. The “Carter
defence” was, in his view, nothing more than a type of evidence put forward to raise a reasonable doubt. That the evidentiary provisions
increased the risk of conviction did not make them substantive. Finally,
he rejected Deschamps J.’s view that the impugned provisions must be
substantive because they infringe section 11(d) of the Charter. Procedural
provisions, too, may infringe Charter rights. In any event, Cromwell J.
held, the Code provisions as they stood following the Court’s decision in
St-Onge Lamoureux did not violate the Charter.76
Note that Cromwell J.’s dissent is not a “perpetual dissent”. He dissented in the concurrently released St-Onge Lamoureux, but he agreed in
Dineley that the retrospectivity of the provisions should be assessed in
their post-St-Onge Lamoureux form.77 Unlike the approach of some Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court,78 Cromwell J. thus accepted the result
in St-Onge Lamoureux and moved on.
5. R. v. Nedelcu79
In Nedelcu the Court split on the interpretation of one of its past
Charter decisions. R. v. Henry80 was a 2005 unanimous decision in which
the Court explained and clarified the law pertaining to section 13 of the
Charter — the protection against using compelled testimony against a
person in another proceeding. In Nedelcu, Moldaver J. (with the Chief
Justice and Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ.) took one
view of Henry. Dissenting, LeBel J. (with Fish and Cromwell JJ.) took
another.
In Nedelcu, the trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine the
accused on prior inconsistent statements made during examination for
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Id., at paras. 21, 43, 67-68, 70, 73.
Id., at para. 73.
Larsen, supra, note 34, at 464.
[2012] S.C.J. No. 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nedelcu”].
Supra, note 17.
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discovery in a tort proceeding — for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility. The statements were not themselves incriminatory. Rather, he
testified in the tort action that he had no memory of the events in question, whereas, in his criminal trial, he gave a detailed account of the
accident. The criminal trial judge disregarded the accused’s testimony
and entered a conviction.81
The majority and dissent agreed that the accused had been compelled
to testify during discovery in the tort proceeding. They split, however, on
whether section 13 of the Charter protected the accused from being
cross-examined on his inconsistent statements from the tort proceeding at
the criminal trial. The Court of Appeal had held, on the basis of Henry,
that the cross-examination was impermissible and that his rights had
been infringed.82
For the majority, Moldaver J. would have allowed the appeal. In his
view, a person can only invoke the protection of section 13 of the Charter
if, at the prior proceeding, he or she: (1) gave “incriminating evidence”,
(2) under compulsion. For him, “incriminating evidence”, for the
purposes of section 13 of the Charter, means “evidence given by the
witness at the prior proceeding that the Crown could use at the
subsequent proceeding, if it were permitted to do so, to prove guilt”.83 If
the prior evidence would be incriminating at the subsequent trial, then
the Crown cannot use it for any purpose at that subsequent trial — that
is, not to prove guilt or to impeach credibility — except in a prosecution
for perjury. In this case, the accused’s prior testimony was not
“incriminating” in this sense, so it was open to the Crown to put it to him
on cross-examination to impeach his credibility. None of this, according
to Moldaver J., was inconsistent with the decision in Henry.84
According to LeBel J., however, the majority’s approach would result in overturning Henry, or, at least, revisiting the principles it
established. That case was clear in rejecting any distinction, for the purposes of section 13 of the Charter, between using compelled testimony to
impeach or to incriminate. Moreover, Binnie J. implicitly rejected as unrealistic any distinction between “incriminating” and “innocuous”
statements. As LeBel J. explains, the focus in Henry was on whether the
witness was compelled, not the nature of the statements made. Justice
81
82
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Moldaver’s approach of drawing distinctions based on the nature of the
statement is both inconsistent with Henry, and, as the minority argument
goes, unworkable and unrealistic in practice.85
The split in Nedelcu was almost exclusively concerned with the interpretation of the Court’s prior unanimous decision in Henry. Four new
judges had been appointed to the Court between Henry and Nedelcu.86
Still, however, most of the members of the panel in Nedelcu also sat on
Henry (five of the nine). For the majority in Nedelcu, the Chief Justice
and Deschamps and Abella JJ. sat on Henry; for the dissent, there were
LeBel and Fish JJ. All five of these judges joined the same decision in
2005, but, seven years later, they were split 3-2.
The minority reasons claim that the majority reinterpreted and reversed Henry; the majority reasons assert that Henry could not have
meant what the minority says. The minority counters that the majority’s
reasons are “unsupported” by the case law, “not raised” by the parties,
and “entirely contrary” to the Crown’s position on the appeal.87 Nevertheless, both sides of the debate couched their rhetoric in the language of
“respect”.88 As noted alongside Cole, speech acts like this maintain the
legitimacy of the majority reasons — even if those reasons do, as put
against the majority, reinterpret recent case law.
6. R. v. Aucoin89
Nedelcu was released in November 2012. So, too, was another
Moldaver-LeBel split: Aucoin. Like in Cole, all of the judges agreed that
there was a breach of section 8 on the facts of the case. Writing for
himself and Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ.,
Moldaver J. held that the unconstitutionally obtained cocaine should be
admitted into evidence. Justice Fish joined with LeBel J. in the view that
it should be excluded. This time, Fish and Abella JJ. were on the opposite
sides of the section 24(2) question — underscoring how case specific the
application of that provision has become.
In Aucoin, the accused was pulled over for driving a vehicle with a
mismatched licence plate (a regulatory offence). The officer smelled

85
86
87
88
89

Id., at paras. 72, 110, 131, 134.
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alcohol on the detained man’s breath, which led him to conduct a
roadside-screening test. The test registered 20 mg of alcohol per 100 mL
of blood — well under the criminal limit, but over the zero tolerance
policy for newly licensed drivers, like Mr. Aucoin, in Nova Scotia. The
officer proceeded to detain the accused for the purpose of issuing him a
summary offence ticket. Apparently because of the poor lighting and his
fear that the accused might just “walk away”, the officer decided to place
Mr. Aucoin in the back of the police cruiser — with the door closed and
locked — as he himself wrote up the ticket in the front seat. Before doing
so, he decided to conduct a pat-down search of the accused for “safety
reasons”. This search led to the discovery of cocaine, some cash, and
Mr. Aucoin’s arrest.
The majority and minority disagreed on how the officer infringed
Mr. Aucoin’s Charter rights. For Moldaver J., the breach occurred when
the officer decided to place the accused in the back of the cruiser. The
ongoing detention for the motor vehicle infractions was lawful, certainly,
but the decision to lock Mr. Aucoin in the cruiser dramatically increased
the interference with his liberty and privacy interests. According to
Moldaver J., the officer had the authority to do this, but only if reasonably
necessary in the totality of the circumstances. The trial judge had not
applied this test, and the evidence did not support a finding that the
officer’s actions were necessary. The accused was thus unlawfully
detained — and this deprived the pat-down search of any basis in law.
Section 8 of the Charter was, accordingly, breached.90
Having articulated the Charter breach in this way, Moldaver J. determined that the admission of the cocaine into evidence would not bring
the administration of justice into disrepute. The officer was attempting to
respect the accused’s rights throughout, and he was not merely following
his usual practice in alcohol-related offences. Nor was he improperly
searching for evidence when he patted down Mr. Aucoin’s pockets. In
short, the officer made a mistake, but he was acting in good faith
throughout.91
Like Moldaver J., LeBel J. concluded that it was not reasonably necessary for the officer to place Mr. Aucoin in the back of the police car as
he wrote out the ticket. The officer’s subjective fear that the accused
might “walk away” was not reasonable — Mr. Aucoin could have simply
90
Id., at paras. 34-35, 39-42, 44, fn. 3. Justice Moldaver found it unnecessary to consider
whether a pat-down search is “always” justified as a prelude to locking a detainee in the cruiser.
91
Id., at paras. 45-46, 49.
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waited for his ticket on the sidewalk. This much was consistent with
Moldaver J.’s approach, but LeBel J. was prepared to go further. “Generally speaking”, he said, “detaining an individual in the locked rear seat of
a police car in order to write out a ticket for a motor vehicle infraction
will rarely strike an appropriate balance between the public’s interest in
effective law enforcement and its interest in upholding the right of individuals to be free from state interference”.92
With respect to the pat-down search, LeBel J. was again prepared to
go further than Moldaver J. Like the majority, the minority holds that the
search was unreasonable given that the detention was unlawful. For
LeBel J., however, it was important to clarify that the search would have
been unreasonable even if it had been reasonably necessary to lock the
accused in the car. The officer testified that he conducted the search
because it was his standard practice to do so. The officer had no reason to
suspect that Mr. Aucoin was carrying a weapon. Moreover, the search
went too far, going “beyond the scope of [a search] that was reasonably
designed to locate weapons”.93
Thus, LeBel J. saw the Charter breaches in this case to be more
serious than Moldaver J. This is particularly reflected in his analysis
under section 24(2). Justice LeBel concluded that the officer’s conduct
was either ignorant of or wilfully disregarded Charter values, and
therefore admitting the evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.94
Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons do not once refer to the majority.
They are written as an entirely different set of reasons — an alternative
approach to the issues before the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the
United States Supreme Court has described this form of dissent as the most
effective.95 It can be read independently of the majority opinion, without
undercutting the legitimacy of the reasons for the Court’s final order.
7. R. v. S. (N.)96
We come, finally, to S. (N.) — the niqab case. This is the only Charter
decision of 2012 to fracture into three separate sets of reasons. The Chief
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Justice wrote for a majority of four: herself and Deschamps, Fish and
Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel (with Rothstein J. concurring) agreed in the
result, but for other reasons. Justice Abella dissented.
S. (N.) concerned the difficult question of how to reconcile the sincere religious convictions of a sexual assault complainant with the trial
rights of the accused. The complainant, N.S., maintained that she had a
sincere religious belief that she was required to wear a niqab in public
when men (other than close relatives) might be present. The accused objected to her wearing the niqab while testifying, however, on the theory
that it interfered with the trier of fact’s ability to assess her credibility
and counsel’s ability to effectively cross-examine the witness — thereby
infringing the Charter guaranteed right to a fair trial. At first instance, the
preliminary inquiry judge questioned the sincerity of N.S.’s religious
belief and ordered her to remove her niqab. She elevated the matter to the
Superior Court, which quashed the order. The Court of Appeal remitted
the matter back to the preliminary inquiry judge to re-determine the issue
in accordance with its reasons.97
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the net result was to dismiss
the appeal and remit the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge.98
According to the Chief Justice, (1) if a witness wears a niqab owing to a
sincere religious belief, (2) she should be required to remove it while
testifying in a criminal proceeding, if (a) this is “necessary to prevent a
serious risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk”; and (b) “the salutory effects
[of this], including the effects on trial fairness, outweigh the deleterious
effects of doing so, including the effects on freedom of religion”.99 In this
way, the conflicting rights would have to be balanced in each case.
Justice LeBel (Rothstein J. concurring) agreed in the result —
remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge — but preferred a
clearer rule. To him, a witness should never be allowed to wear a niqab
while testifying in a criminal proceeding. Though he agreed with the
Chief Justice that the Court faced a clash between religious rights, on one
hand, and the right to make full answer and defence, on the other, he held
that the “equation” involved other factors — including the openness and
religious neutrality of the justice system. According to LeBel J., it would
97
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not be consistent with these constitutional values and traditions to permit
a witness to wear a niqab while testifying.100
Justice Abella also preferred a clearer rule, but she would have gone
the other way. For her, the case should have been resolved with a clear
direction that, where it is established that the witness has a sincere belief
that she is required to wear a niqab (as here), she should always be
permitted to wear it in court, unless the accused can demonstrate that her
face is directly relevant (e.g., where identity is in issue). Otherwise, the
harm of requiring the complainant to remove her niqab outweighs any
damage to trial fairness.101
S. (N.) is remarkable as a judicial work product. All three of the possible resolutions to the conflicting rights were addressed and defended by
the Court: LeBel J. preferred an absolute prohibition; Abella J. emphasized the complainant’s interest in wearing her niqab; and the Chief
Justice (for the majority) assumed the middle ground with a contextual
balance of the competing rights. In sum, S. (N.) contains a rich spectrum
of legal debate.
There can be no doubt that the strengths and weaknesses of the
majority and two minority opinions in S. (N.) will continue to be debated
in civil society. It is difficult to predict, however, what will come of this
dialogue. The majority has only really opened the door to the debate hall.
It is one thing to say that two conflicting Charter rights ought to be
balanced according to the Dagenais/Mentuck framework102 — it is
another to actually carry this out on the ground. How does one put
religious freedom and trial fairness into the same balance? Are these
norms even capable of being weighed against one another? The opinions
of LeBel and Abella JJ. will no doubt influence this ongoing debate.

III. CONCLUSION
The seven Charter dissents (and concurrences) from 2012 provide a
surprisingly rich illustration of the functions and features of dissenting
opinions. Dissents do not, of course, fall neatly into categories — but
2012 has delivered dissents that emphasize the goals of prophesy (R. v.
St-Onge Lamoureux and, with any luck, Nedelcu and Aucoin); dialogue
100
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(L. (S.) and S. (N.)); and the integrity of the judicial system (Cole). 2012
also provided an instance of a justice expressly electing not to perpetually dissent (Dineley), and one dissenting opinion written entirely
independent of the majority (Aucoin). All seven were outcome-oriented
or (often, and) they used the language of “respect”. None undercut the
majority. The 2012 Charter dissents were, all things told, an encouraging
assortment.

